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CONATION AND MENTAL ACTIVITY. I[1]

THIS article owes its existence and inspiration to Professor Stout's paper on "Conation and Mental Activity," in the *British Journal of Psychology,* Volume II., Part I.—*Mais je suis plus royaliste que le roi.* He seems to me at times to concede too much. But it would be altogether an error to suppose the main purport of my discussion to be critical. It is conceived rather as illustrative than as critical. As an old pupil of Professor Stout's I follow in one or two issues what I had always understood, perhaps erroneously, to have been his teaching rather than the verbal expression given to his views in the valuable paper which I have taken for a text.

I. What does Conation Imply?

1. *The Simple Conation.*—Dr. Stout thus describes what he appears to regard as the simplest state of conation. His words are: "There is the knowledge or thought of a certain actual situation and of a possible alteration in it; and the alteration is not only thought of but also wanted. This is sufficient to constitute what I call mental activity or conation."[2] But are not these things more than sufficient? May not a conative state be simpler than this? Dr. Stout describes for us a highly developed and complex state. It possesses definite intellectual characters, namely, a particularized element of change within a total situation regarded as relatively permanent, and is really a state of desire with a rather well-defined aim.

To me it seems necessary to include among conative states, not only such highly developed complexes as this, but those "felt tendencies" which appear to accompany any biologic trend, even when end, and aim, and want, and wish, have, for the individual in question, never emerged into conscious life at all. As an illustration, consider the case of a young man falling in love—a normal person, not "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," nor rationalized

[1] This paper was read before the British Psychological Society on November 14, 1908. The lecture form is preserved.

[2] *British Journal of Psychology,* Vol. II., Pt. I., p. 2.

into supermanity. The onlooker sees the signs and tells him he's going to fall in love. He rejects the imputation with contempt; he has not been comfortable of late, that is true; but "Fall in love! He! With girls!" Here we have no thought of a present situation with a possible alteration thought of and desired. The tendency is toward an end, not only not thought of, but actually rejected when suggested. Not, however, rejected when the appropriate stimulus appears. The reaction is swift and sure. The reader will see, doubtless, that I have given an instance which, if the analysis be correct, will stand for many cases of instinctive conative tendencies in their early stages.

To speak of "felt tendency" may seem clearly to indicate an end or aim. But, in these early stages of instinctive activities, the aim is not defined except for the onlooker. Swiftly comes the rejoinder, "Then why speak of tendency at all, how do you know of any such tendency; and how, above all, do you know that feeling is, involved?" The tendency can be measured, roughly, it is true, by the resistance manifested when the animal is forcibly shifted off the track. At least, a tendency can be inferred. That feelings may be involved becomes obvious to any one who tries to do it. One would infer them, of course, from the animal's movements or other activities, in the same way as one may infer those of one's philosophic friends.

And passing higher up the evolutionary scale of conative states, we come to those in which we dimly cognize an aim or end, but it is seen vaguely; "we follow a light that never was on sea or land;" it is hardly yet a thought of a certain actual situation and of a possible alteration in it. Conative states need not, in my judgment, have a defined intellectual element any more than an emotion need. The latter we know, from everyday experience, often loses strength in proportion as it becomes particularized to a definite issue. H. S. Merriman says somewhere, "Surely the hell of the coward will be a twilight land of vague, shadowy dangers, ever approaching and receding"; and G. P. R. James, "It is uncertainty which gives its sting to dread." And the same writer, speaking of a heroine in distress, writes: "We must not say she thought either of her situation at the time, of the past, of the future; for there was nothing like thought in her mind. It was all despair." And who supposes for one moment that when Keats was distilling the crudities of his pessimism into the fragrant essence of his verse which describes this world as one

"Where men sit and hear each other groan,
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last grey hairs,
Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies,
Where but to think is to be full of sorrow
And leaden-eyed despairs;
Where beauty can not keep her lustrous eyes,
Or new love pine at them beyond to-morrow,"

this process of defining his grief by giving its reasons was other than an amelioration of his sorrows. Even for us who read, pessimism so well expressed is apt to be without poignancy.

We are pleased *before* we know what pleases us: we rage and kick the table because we have scalded ourselves with the tea: we throw a book away because we dislike its contents, feeling some satisfaction in damaging its appearance and heedless that we may be thereby promoting its circulation. But when we know exactly what it is that has upset us and can fasten our attention exclusively on that, and especially when we can also decide what to do in consequence, the mental state is resolved into one much less dominantly emotional. As emotions are particularized and made definite by experience, so our undeveloped conations, our inchoate strivings toward we know not what, become defined and specialized; vague craving becomes open-eyed desire. We know better what we want. When we know precisely what we want we are said by others to be matter-of-fact persons with no hopeful cravings at all, and there is truth in their view, for the complete organization of the tendency throws the conative aspect out of sight; it is rarely present in consciousness as such.

And passing from these instances in which introspection must supply our evidence, let us consider some of the general conative states the strength of whose "felt tendency" is well known, namely: those in which religious or political ideals are involved. The kingdom of God for which we strive has never yet been within us. If we build it at all, we shall build it better than we know.

"The hand that rounded Peter's dome,
And groined the aisles of Christian Rome,
Wrought in a sad sincerity;
Himself from God he could not free,
He builded better than he knew."
The Problem—Emerson.

A socialistic debater the other day in answer to questions as to details of reconstruction said, "We are not provided with a cut and dried scheme, we simply preach the social revolution." And if action is to depend upon the satisfaction of great waves of tendency in the masses of the people, there is no doubt that the answer was psychologically wise. As Burke says, "Reformation is one of those pieces

which must be put at some distance in order to please. Its greatest favorers love it better in the abstract than in the concrete." This was said, doubtless, with a view to disparaging reform, but is, of course, equally true of all human effort guided by an ideal of any kind.

Ideals are always

> "The desire of the moth for the star,
> Of the night for the morrow,
> The devotion to something afar."

We need not say with Virgil, *Omne ignotum pro magnifico;* but we must admit that the unknown that is desired enthrals us more than when it becomes less novel and better known. Exact definition seems to damp enthusiasm and discourage activity. The young man wants more intensely than his seniors, though he does not know so well what he wants; the "felt tendency" is stronger though less defined.

It is not, however, enough to feel strong tendencies and ardent longings, nor even enough to arouse huge waves of almost formless enthusiasm in ourselves and others. If conations are to work themselves out to an end, intellective factors become many and various and complicated. The politician who supplies sweeping and emotional generalizations for the public platform becomes in the committee room hard, logical, and greedy for facts; as, indeed, he must be, if any advance whatever is to be made towards the gratification of the hopes he has been raising. But the driving force, the essence of the conative state, resides not in the detailed intellectualizing of the committee room, but in the vague enthusiasms of the party.

Thus far, then, I have tried to show how, both individually and socially, conation may be a much simpler state than that intellectualized complex with which we started and that, as "felt tendency," it is apt to be stronger when less clearly defined.

2. *The Complex Conation.*—But, obviously, it is unsatisfactory to consider conation only on its lower levels; the sporadic, excursive, vague, and jerky strivings of the youth develop into the organized passions of the man, as Mr. Shand has recently shown. A conation now may include so much, that its defeat may involve even the overthrow of that arch-conation, the will to live. It is said truly that "all a man has will he give for his life"; but he will give life itself for something he has not. "If success is no longer possible then all this laboriously acquired knowledge is in vain, nor can I find a joy in life if this goal be gone. 'Labor is its own reward,' it is said. But my labor is now as futile to me as gold to a miser when it has lost its purchasing power—the joy has gone out of it." In such wise speaks the man whose master passion is realized as futile. If such states as these are conative states they will obviously be as complex

as mental life itself, but they are still conative; they possess the same characteristics as the blind unconscious trend of the instinct-driven animal; they are tendencies and they are felt. The great majority of our conative states are, however, not as highly organized as this. I may know I have a tendency to drink and therefore try to avoid public-houses because I have also a tendency to be a respectable person. I want both, but I want the latter more than the former, and I will the latter and never the former; but the conation is not extinguished, though defeated; the uncertain gyration of my legs is evidence of struggle when my orbit nears an alcoholic star.

Conation, then, though it need not imply the apprehension of an existing situation, the thought of a change in it, and the desire for that change, may involve all these things. But this complex errs by defect; it is not yet conative; it must include the tendency toward the goal. Hell, it is said, is paved with good intentions, wished-for changes which are non-conative. But if the tendency is there, I argue that conation is present, though the defining intellectual factors are absent. And there is a further justification for a usage of the term which requires no complexity of elaboration before it can be applied. If we have the thought of the existing situation, the change in it, the desire for the change, and the movement toward it, we have something very like voluntary decision after comparison. And it would be nothing short of calamitous, after the word "conation" had supplied us with a term to describe so much wilfullness with so little willed decision, that we should be shunted back again and told that conation implies all these characteristics of voluntary choice.

II. Conation and Activity

1. *Does Everything Affect Everything Else?*—What are the grounds for describing conation as mental activity? Dr. Stout says, "Plainly no finite process can claim to be called an activity unless it counts as a factor in determining other processes," and then falls back on the principle of the unity of the universe, which is that every state or process plays a part in determining the nature of other states or processes. Our conations are processes of some sort, therefore they must in some way be effective because everything affects everything else. That, as I understand him, is his argument. Of course they need not be successful to be effective, that is, to be active in Dr. Stout's sense. A locomotive runs, though only for a smash, even if it is off the rails—"it counts in some way as a factor in determining the course of events." But is it not arguing, as it were, backwards to assert activity on the basis of the all-togetherness of the universe? Is not the work of science, psychological and otherwise, just the very investigation into the extent of the truth of the as-

sumption or postulate, here called the principle of the unity of the universe?

We try to find out whether, between the identifiable things and processes of the world, material and mental, the principle here postulated is true. We try to find, that is, the uniformities, the positive and negative correlations, and the indifferences between these constituent parts and processes. Must we count everything as operating on everything else? On the contrary, if we were not able to say "That does not matter" to most of the actual conditions which the world presents, we should never work a successful experiment at all; we rule these things out and say they are irrelevant. They *may not be*, it is true; but we can not get on without in every case deciding that many things are irrelevant; and, moreover, we think we can show in specific cases that they are so. I am aware that it is asserted that, without a postulate of efficiency, that is, without an *a priori* belief that everything does affect everything else, we should not investigate at all, and I shall be told that there is a school of investigators, who, fixing upon *any* two measurable elements in the universe, can show whether they are connected or not by certain ingenious formulæ, and that these workers would not measure all and sundry in this way if they did not suppose a possible connection. It turns out, however, in practise, that this school of investigators, like other people, limit their investigations and employ their formulæ only upon elements which common sense and ordinary experience lead them to suppose are probably connected. For example; a man may spend his time very profitably in investigating the degree of correlation between insanity and the use of alcohol, or size of body and mental proficiency in man; he will not, ordinarily, occupy himself with the relation between, let us say, the variation of imagination in school-children and the variation in the length of the antennæ in certain insects; nor, shall we say, with the position of the herrings in the Atlantic and the proposed sites for Billingsgate Market. Yet, if the only connections we know are established by correlation formulæ, and if we really work on the postulate or principle (I double the term to give no offense to opposing schools of philosophy) of the unity of the universe—that every thing or process affects everything else—such an investigation would be perfectly justified.

Conation, if it is to depend for its title of "*active*" upon a metaphysical postulate that every process is so, will, I think, find great difficulty in establishing its right to the name.

Though he accepts the postulate or principle (which I do not), Dr. Stout feels that conation, though a process and therefore active, can not, because of this, be called *mental* activity. This consideration brings us to the next step, where, if I understand him rightly,

I am only presenting from another point of view what Dr. Stout elaborates in his second section.[3]

If "felt tendency" is a myth, if it is neither causal in nature, nor indicative of causes in nature, then the only basis for the human sciences, as well as for the physical sciences, is in precisely that correlation of measurable elements which we just adverted to. But is this so? If I wish, for example, to be convinced that price rises with demand when the supply remains fixed, I can do this by noticing the changes in my own mind when an increasing number of people want what I alone can supply, say the pleasure (if any) of my company. I could probably arrive at a similar result by noticing the proportion of refusals and acceptances as my total invitations increased or decreased. A careful man will quantify his rough introspective estimates by keeping records; but he will have no doubt as to what is the cause of his rising price; he will, indeed, feel his price rising as he receives the additional invitations, a feeling which involves a tendency to refuse the less attractive ones. These "felt tendencies" are, indeed, the bases of the classical political economy and are the foundations, the more irrefragable foundations, of the human sciences: they constitute its superior certitudes. But can these be trusted by themselves? Do they not provide us with the alarming variations in the human sciences? For I do not mean that I am straightway to be sure that my own state of mind is a microcosmos which reflects the same thing in the rest of mankind. I can not incontinently, like a religious reformer, proclaim my own state universal; others may not be like me; and, if they are not, they will not, especially if they belong to the same learned society, allow me to put my "felt tendency" forward as if it were theirs; they all know something about it; they carry the material of the science about with them, and do not absorb it through the medium of definitions as if it were, say, mathematical physics.

2. *What is the Test of Activity?*—Let us turn back for a moment to the commencement of the last section. The argument ran as follows: there can be no activity without efficiency, and efficient here means having a determining effect upon other processes, and is not, as in ordinary speech, limited to successful action. Either, then, there may be mental processes which are not active, or all mental process must, in some way, be effective. True, the most careful introspection might fail to ascertain this and so it was asserted that we must fall back upon the principle of the unity of the universe.

I have tried to show, whilst believing firmly that conation is a mental activity, that to base a proof of it on this general ground is far from satisfactory. Nor is it really relied on by Dr. Stout. We

[3] *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. II., Pt. I., p. 3.

need more than this to characterize mental activity, and he goes on to state that it must be a tendency. With this account as descriptive of conation I heartily agree, differing only in believing that we can have conative tendency with little intellectual activity and, indeed, without any distinguishable intellective element at all.

There is always a danger that we shall slip unawares into every-day usage, which tends to restrict the term mental activity to intellectual activity. It certainly seems that, in this sense, there may be much activity without conation; the intellect may play vigorously, but there may be no desire to come to a conclusion, and there may be complete indifference as to what the conclusion is. And, on the other hand, there may be a strong conative tendency with little, if any, intellectual movement. And these two states may even exist in the same mind at the same time. Such a condition is admirably described by Anthony Hope in "Phroso." The hero is in great danger. He thus describes his own mental state: "Then I was off, far away, to England, to my friends there, to the gaiety of London now in its full rushing tide, to Mrs. Hipgrave's exclusive receptions, to Beatrice's gay talk and pretty insolence, to Hamlyn's gilded dulness, in rapid survey of the panorama that I knew so well. Then I would turn back to the scene I had left, and again bid my farewell under the quiet sky, in prospect of the sea that turned to gold. So I passed back and forward till I seemed myself hardly a thinking man, but rather a piece of blank glass, across which the myriad mites of the kaleidoscope chased one another, covering it with varying colors, but none of them imparting their hue to it.

"Yet all this time, by the strange division of mental activity of which I have spoken, I was crawling cautiously but quickly up the mountainside, with eyes keen to pierce the dusk that now fell, with ears apt to find an enemy in every rustling leaf and a hostile step in every woodland sound."

Psychologists, though ordinary language will tend to make them, like other people, confuse mental activity with intellectual activity, will be quite sure that the mind is a feeling mind, and a mind that wills as well as a mind that thinks; and that we can quite as well speak of mental activity as applied to willing and feeling as we can as applied to thinking. They may, perhaps, not so readily admit that, genetically prior to these distinctions, the mind is a conative mind which strives or, as this is too introspective a word, tends. Is this tendency an activity? If we take an external view and decide that activity is defined by result, I suppose there would be few biologists of to-day who would not assert that these native tendencies are the most effective things in life, and we each of us know how hard it is to overcome them either in other animals or ourselves. Moreover,

common experience of the world tells us that it is the intensely conative person rather than the man of merely abundant thought or emotional plenitude who wins his way and affects his generation.

But some conations are defeated, at least in this sense; are they active then? Yes, if we can show that other things or processes have been affected. But, if we can not? Then, from the external point of view, we should be wiser to assert nothing. And it is from this point of view that the dispute is of real importance. Introspection may, and does, put us on the track; but it is not enough to follow the path mentally, we must show others where it is and what it leads to. Though, therefore, I incline to the opinion that the experience of our own conations is entirely responsible for the conceptions of activity as applied to the material elements of the universe, it seems necessary, if these conations are to be regarded as agencies—things which affect other elements in the universe—that we should adopt our usual methodology to discover whether they are, or are not, causes, that is, whether they are active in a scientific sense.

But what of the intellectual play which is not conative? Is this an activity? Yes, if it can be shown to be effective, since this is the test we are adopting. And common introspection somewhat bears out this view. "What are you doing?" we ask. "Oh, nothing," is the answer; "just dreaming." Now dreaming is at least relatively, if not wholly, detached from conative thought, though there may be involved an abundance of ideas and images. Moreover, when we ask how a person is getting on with his studies, we do not mean to ask how many intellectual coruscations he has in mental view, but how far he is producing certain effects, mental or otherwise.

It seems to me, on the whole, that we should regard conation as active apart from the shifting intellectual elements which successively define it, and apart from the emotional accompaniments which cluster along its pathway to success or defeat. To me, indeed, activity or effectiveness is the very essence of the conative state.

W. H. WINCH.

LONDON.

MAY A REALIST BE A PRAGMATIST?

II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INSTRUMENTALISM[1]

IN the previous paper, realism was defined as the theory that objects that are known are in no way dependent for their existence upon the fact that they are known. Pragmatism was defined as the composite doctrine comprising (1) biological pragmatism, or the instrumentalist theory of knowledge; (2) psycholog-

[1] For the first paper of this series see this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., p. 460.

ical pragmatism, or the motor theory of truth; (3) ontological pragmatism, or the humanistic theory of reality; (4) logical pragmatism, or the theory that "the truth of a proposition depends upon the value of its consequences." In the present paper, we are to analyze the first of these four phases of pragmatism with a view to determining whether its implications are realistic or subjectivistic.

In Schopenhauer's "The World as Will and Idea"[2] occurs the following passage: "Thus knowledge generally, rational as well as merely sensuous, proceeds originally from the will itself, belongs to the inner being of the higher grades of its objectification as a mere μηχάνη, a means of supporting the individual and the species, just like any organ of the body. Originally destined for the service of the will, for the accomplishment of its aims, it remains almost throughout entirely subjected to its service: it is so in all brutes and in almost all men." If we substitute for Schopenhauer's single cosmic will, with its tragically mistaken aim at self-realization, the concrete organisms in situations in which their needs and desires are for the moment in conflict with one another and with their environment, we could take the above passage as a tolerable formulation of the instrumentalist theory of knowledge. When desires, by reason of their complexity, are no longer able to secure immediate and automatic satisfaction, knowledge and thinking are evolved and by natural selection preserved as new and useful instruments of adaptation to environment. Now without raising, except incidentally, the point as to the truth of this theory[3] I wish to ask three questions concerning it: (1) Does it presuppose an objective world which exists independently of our cognitive experience of it, and which antedates that experience? (2) Does it make necessary any new and subjectivistic type of criterion for evaluating the truth of a judgment? (3) Does it restrict the legitimate application of our thought to the subjective realm of desire and experience? The answer to the first question must, it seems to me, be a very emphatic affirmative. Not only have the instrumentalist's concepts, such as "environment," "organism," "evolution," "natural selection," no meaning except as applied to a real world of material objects, but the very notion of thought as having evolved as a useful instrument or organ of adaptation implies the prior existence of that world of thinkable objects to which thought is adapted. Eyes would

[2] Haldane and Kemp's translation, p. 199.

[3] This view of the origin of thought seems to me to be true except in so far as it overlooks the part which the environment plays in forcing itself and its specific qualities upon our notice, oftentimes independently of, or even in direct antagonism to, our needs and desires. Truths are sometimes achieved by us, but at other times they are thrust upon us.

be of no use, and would never have evolved, unless there had existed light. Wings would never have evolved unless there had existed air. An instrument such as an axe would never have been invented and continued in use except in a world which contained things to chop. How then could thought with its categories have originated and developed as an increasingly useful instrument unless the world contained thinkable objects and relations? And unless things *were* pretty much what we think them to be, why should it be useful to think of them so? Why should it be useful to think of the world as a system of bodies and events extending indefinitely in space and time far beyond the scope of any finite experience, unless there was such a world? In short, the more earnestly we pursue the analogy between the faculty of cognition and a biological organ or instrument, the more clear does it become that *the only conceivable basis for an idea or a belief being generally and permanently useful,* is *that it is true*—true in the realistic sense of conforming to or pointing to a reality that is in no sense created by it. If ideas or beliefs created their objects, the process of thought would be arbitrary; one belief would be as useful, or rather as useless, as another. In short, instrumentalism interpreted ontogenetically and phylogenetically not only presupposes the most thoroughgoing type of realism, but it furnishes a new and powerful argument against subjectivism. For if there were no other way of determining whether the objects which we experience existed, and existed in a very specific and determinate manner, when we did not experience them, the mere fact that the assumption that they do so exist is useful and helpful to us in satisfying our needs, would, in itself, afford a powerful presumption in favor of its truth.

But now when we ask the second of the three questions proposed above, the realistic implications of the instrumentalist theory of knowledge may not be so plain. Does this theory of the origin and evolution of thought afford any new criterion for evaluating judgments as to their truth or falsity? I confess I am unable to see how the knowledge that an instrument is useful can throw any light on the problem of how to use it. The way in which an axe should be used is determined not by the fact that the axe was made for use, but by the properties of the wood which we desire to chop. Again, the way in which an optical instrument should be used, whether it be the eye itself or a telescope, is determined entirely by the laws of light. Our needs and desires do indeed tell us *where, when,* and *how much,* to use our instruments, but the *how* is always determined by the nature of the objects upon which the instrument is to be used. Admitting that thought originates as a means of removing the obstacles that balk our desires, the way in which thought does this

is thought's own business. To say that the criterion of truth is the satisfaction of desire would be like saying that the most useful way to use an axe was to use it usefully. Thought is useful because we can adjust ourselves better to the present immediate situation if we know something about other situations. We can satisfy the needs of future situations more surely if we think out what those situations will be; and we can do this only by recalling and analyzing past situations. But the objective nature of what we desire to think about, always has and always will constitute the sole clue to determine how we should think about it. If the situation which I need to think out is a conflict of my own desires and hopes, why then the efficiency of my thinking is measured by the extent of my knowledge of the nature of those desires and hopes. If I am thinking about concrete situations, the truth of my judgments will be determined by the extent to which they conform to the nature of those concrete situations. If I wish to think about something abstract, such as the properties of space or number, the truth of my ideas is entirely determined by the nature of space or number.

There has been much said in the name of pragmatism about the "abstractness" of intellectualistic logic, by which is meant, I suppose, the tendency to forget that any given thought activity is always directed to a given situation and controlled in its procedure by the nature of that situation, and that, consequently, there is no such thing as thinking *überhaupt*. But the same sort of caution might be given, with at least equal justice, to any one who, in the name of pragmatism, should treat of desire or need or activity *überhaupt*. Our beliefs and judgments, considered as instruments, are valuable or true in so far as they satisfy needs, not "needs in general," but rather the specific needs of knowing certain facts at certain times. And the only ways to test the value of judgments are the two that have always been recognized by the old-fashioned logic. We may (1) test the truth of a judgment by comparing the fact which it asserts with the same fact as directly experienced, which is the way of inductive verification; or (2), when the fact asserted by a judgment is not directly experienceable, we may test the truth of the judgment indirectly by ascertaining its consistency with other judgments whose truth has been tested previously, which is the way of deduction. I can see nothing in the instrumentalist theory of the nature and origin of thought that would overthrow or even supplement these well-known criteria of testing truth.

But now for our third question: Does instrumentalism restrict the application of human thinking to the subjective sphere of our desires? Does the fact that thought always originates from the need

to satisfy some desire determine in any way what it is that is thought about? Stated in this way, the question answers itself in the negative. Men desire all sorts of things, some of which are objective, and some of which are subjective; and they desire the same things now for an ulterior purpose, and again for no ulterior purpose. I may desire to know economics for no motive other than curiosity; to gratify my need, I shall have to think and study economic facts and laws. Or, again, my desire to be a philanthropist may be the reason for my study of economics. Or my study of economics may be motived by a desire to make money by teaching it, or by a desire to speculate more successfully in stocks. Any one of a hundred different motives may lead me to exercise my cognitive faculties in a given direction. But the fact that thinking is always to some purpose, and is an instrument for the achievement of that purpose, throws no light at all on the sphere and scope of thought. But, it may be said, I am taking desire, need, and purpose in a far broader sense than they are intended. Granting that thought may now be used as a means to any and all purposes, it originated only from practical needs, and hence the type of situation which in the first instance called it forth will, or should, determine its future application. But to this it might be replied that all evolution is rich in cases in which organs or instruments outgrow their original uses and functions. Almost every organ that satisfies a previously existing need calls into being new needs whose satisfaction is to be got by new uses of the organ. In social evolution the institutions which man created, end by in large measure creating him. If art or religion, for example, could be shown to have had a purely practical origin, it would be no indication that their later functions either are or should be primarily practical. The advent of the thinking habit makes of man a new being, a thinking being, and no longer merely a practical being. Theoretical curiosity as to the nature of the world becomes emancipated from the practical needs which engendered it. Man no longer has merely the need to live, he has also the need to know. Indeed a new means of adaptation may easily become the dominant and controlling interest, and what was originally the end get to be, in its turn, merely a means for the realization of the potentialities of the new instrument. In the case of thought and reason this seems actually to have come about. Man began to think in order that he might eat, he has evolved to the point where he eats in order that he may think. By which I mean that what is most distinctive of human life is the subordination of the physical needs of the animal organism to the fulfillment of the entire system of intellectual, esthetic, and spiritual aspirations. To assume that the use and purpose of a function are limited by the motives which originally called it forth,

is counter to the whole trend and meaning of evolution. To deny the legitimacy of abstract problems or problems about the nature of the universe, on the ground that thought made its first appearance in racial and individual life as an instrument for solving very concrete and very practical problems of conduct, is like denying that we should use our fingers to manage a pen or to play a musical instrument on the ground that fingers originated from the peculiarly arboreal needs of our animal ancestors.

Thus we have seen that whether we interpret the "needs" from which thought is supposed to have originated in such a general sense, as to imply simply that all thinking is purposive, or whether we interpret those needs as distinctively practical—in either case the instrumentalist theory of the genesis of human knowledge can throw no light whatever on the canons for correct thinking or on the proper sphere and scope of our cognitive interests. The instrumentalist theory is probably, in large measure, true; it is, at any rate, interesting, and it illuminates in a remarkable manner the historical development of our categories. It is a much-needed corrective of the over-intellectualistic psychology which conceived all forms of human experience as confused or degenerate products of a primordial reason, or transcendental ego, capable of functioning *überhaupt*, and of generating the world of space and time. Instrumentalism is, in fact, the courageous application of Darwinism to the highest of all life, the life of reason. But to regard it as having any special relevancy either to logic or to epistemology is, it seems to me, to misinterpret profoundly the relation between the problems of genesis and the problems of method and goal.

The question: "May a realist be a pragmatist of the biological or instrumentalist type?" may then be answered in the affirmative. A realist may be an instrumentalist, and an instrumentalist must be a realist; for to think of thought as an instrument of adaptation to an environing world, while denying with the idealist the preexisting reality and independence of that world, would be either self-contradictory or meaningless.

W. P. MONTAGUE.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR JAMES ON CONCEPTION

IT is related in the biography of Clerk Maxwell that from early childhood his interest in the mechanism, the "how," of any object was always the first thing with him. "What's the *go* o' that?" he would ask continually. And no mere general account would content him. "What," he would ask, "is the *particular* go of it?"

This is the search for conceptual knowledge in one of its simplest forms, but it provides a convenient symbol and metaphor for all such search. The endeavor to conceive has usually been deemed an innocent habit in the philosopher, natural or moral, and Professor James's prohibition of the habit seems at first sight like a command to the inquiring boy, "Go back and look at the thing, but refrain from thinking about it." Why are we to be snubbed in this way? I can not help thinking that Professor James is misled, for one thing, by his own matchless power of metaphor.

It is seldom fair to cross-question metaphors, and Professor James's are so vivid and delightful that one is not tempted to cross-question except when, as in the present case, they lead us to quite specially inconvenient results. But when the inconvenience makes one look back, his conception-metaphors seem to me to be really puzzling from the first. We "lay hold of our experiences by" concepts, he says; we string reality on them; they are extracted samples, or photographs. "To understand life by concepts is to arrest its movement, cutting it up into bits as with scissors."[1] I can only say that I don't think I do anything of the sort, and I don't see how it is done. "Concept" must mean either an act of conceiving or a content conceived. For me, the first is a process or event, and therefore neither a string nor a pair of pincers. The second is an element in presented reality, and that again is not a string, but a current or a nerve—a real thing seen.

It is ill to contend in metaphors with a master of metaphor; yet my way of expressing the facts surely avoids the difficulties of the other way, and therefore suggests that they are difficulties of allegory only. In my account, sensation gives us our first and most elementary seeing or feeling of the experience-stream. The rest—perception and conception and their like—are "seeing what," "seeing how," "seeing into"; they are the unfolding of the bud; the epiphany of the rainbow in the heart of the sunshine. The first shimmer of the stream's surface grows as we look at it into the crumpled silver tissue of crossing ripples and patterned gleams, and deepens into levels whence bubbles rise, and undercurrents that crease the surface above and stir the sand below, and all "the light and sound and darkness" of the stream's heart. This it is to conceive. We come to see not only the glint of the stream, but the make of it, "the go of it." And I no more substitute my concepts for sense-reality than I substitute the undercurrents or the shaping bed for the flash of the surface. Nor do I ever assert that either alone can give the whole truth.

I have two quarrels with Professor James's moral of "back to sense."

[1] *The Hibbert Journal*, April, 1909, p. 568.

1. If words are to have any ordinary meaning, he is surely attributing to sense-experience a richness which it can not have till thought supervenes. It is after all literally true, as Mill and Berkeley teach us, that with the eyes of our body we can not see a man, nor a stream either. We are so much used to extending the meaning of "sight" that perhaps illustration from touch and hearing will impress the truth better. Think of the poverty and barrenness of a succession of touches in the dark, which we can not read off, or interpret, or recognize. Or think of the ear assailed by a continuous meaningless clash of instruments. The listener's "whole experience" is altered, we say carelessly, when he realizes at last that five familiar tunes are being played at once. Perhaps it is, but "sensation" is just our name for *the element which is supposed unaltered.* In so far as the experience changes, it is something more than sense. Relations, says Professor James, are "just as integral members of the sensational flux as terms are."[2] True, for neither terms nor relations, neither notes nor tunes, were "given" us in that clash and blare. They were there for the finding, but it was not sensation that could find them. What is secret in sense gives up its secrets in thought. "Intellectualistic writers of sensation insist that sensations are disjoined only. Radical empiricism insists that conjunctions between them are just as immediately given as disjunctions are."[3] Both are "immediately" given, I agree, but not in sense. Confined to sense, we know sensations neither as disjoined nor as conjoined. Such terms and such relations are revealed when we open our eyes wide enough to see them. "Pure sensation," for such a writer as Green,[4] is surely the unreachable limiting case of experience accepted without any inspection; with our eyes narrowed to a thread's width; with the given confined to the one field and forbidden to expand or reveal itself in other fields. Hence we have neither "One, and then two, and then three," nor yet "one, with two and three," but only "one, one, one," each forgotten as it passes; or rather it is "thus, thus, thus"; or, still more, it is "thu-u-u-u-s-s-s-s—" to the end of the chapter. It is a buzzing which must not expand into "bee."

2. "The immediate feeling of life solves the problems which so baffled our conceptual intelligence."[5] Not at all; it sets them. Let us grant to Professor James that in one sense of the word we are "given" all sorts of things as "integral members of the sensational

[2] "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 279.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 280.

[4] I agree with Professor James in objecting to Green's speaking as if our own "combining thought" created relations instead of finding them; as if it "did something" to sense experience, instead of finding in it what sense can not find.

[5] "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 260. *The Hibbert Journal*, p. 574.

flux," just as we are given Mr. Chamberlain in a puzzle picture; still the problem is to find them. We have experience folded; the problem is to unfold it. The "feeling" gives us the going thing; conceptual intelligence seeks for the go of it. The stream runs and shines; but what is that running? How do the currents turn and cross and enfold one another? It shines, but what is *in* the shine and the blue?

It seems to me that in this matter Professor James has misunderstood Mr. Bradley's complaints. Mr. Bradley, I take it, stands with us by the stream of experience, and we indicate to him certain elements, and movements, and directions, and eddies, which we seem to make out in its flow. "Such and such relations, such and such attributes; such natures of time and space." Mr. Bradley's comment is, "A very slovenly piece of work. If those two currents are on one level, as you say, how can their crossing look like that? How can the eddy you trace in that corner throw such a shadow on the sand? Your scheme is right in its main lines, perhaps, but in some ways it is shamefully scamped and muddled. You must learn to see better than this." To which Professor James replies, "But the stream does run."

None of us, surely, are denying the fact of experience. The instruments, we all admit, are blaring in our ears. We, common-sense philosophers, have resolved the noise fairly satisfactorily to ourselves, into our five familiar tunes. Then comes Mr. Bradley to torment us. "Are you sure," he says, "that these are really the tunes you hear? It occurs to me that not one of them can be exactly as you maintain. How can this and that conjunction come in? How can this particular dissonance be possibly rendered in that way? Are you right in reading it as five tunes at all?" When we are thoroughly bewildered with this teasing, Professor James comes to reassure us; and he says, "Thought finds impossibility in tasks which sense-experience easily performs."[6] "With a world of particulars, given in loveliest union—the "how" of which you "understand" as soon as you see the fact of them, for there is no how except the constitution of the fact as given—he asks for some ineffable union—which, if he gained it, would only be a duplicate of what he has already in his full possession."[7] "Never mind the tunes; there is a great deal of noise going on."

One must confess that Mr. Bradley exposes himself rather recklessly to having his point missed, on account of the unexpectedness of his transition from "appearance" to "reality." We know how in a sunny brook the eddies cast trembling but stationary shadows

[6] "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 256.

[7] "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 369.

on the sand at the bottom; and it is often easier to see the shadow than to find the knot or crumple which is the eddy itself—much easier than it is to see the run of the water in the knot.

Now Mr. Bradley, after tormenting us about our careless reading of the make-up of the brook, quite suddenly gives up any attempt to help us with it, and drops down to this fixed shadow-scheme at the bottom. "*Somehow,*" he says, "to cast these shadows, the real water-currents must be thus and thus, though we can not see how they manage it." But the spectator, seeing the speaker's eyes so abruptly turned from the body of the stream to its bed, concludes that in Mr. Bradley's opinion the stream does not exist. "For this philosopher," he concludes, "there is only the surface and the bed; appearance and reality; a fleeting veil of gleams above a stretch of patterned sand."

There are three truths and three corresponding falsehoods in Professor James's texts, and every one of them can, with a little straining of the reader's eyes, be found in the works of Mr. Bradley.

(*a*) "Do not," says Professor James, "condemn reality as soon as you find difficulty in seeing how it works. Be modest, and doubt whether you have seen rightly." This is a gentle statement of Mr. Bradley's judgment, which is, "Your seeing is that of a sloppy-minded imbecile." They join in condemning our poor attempts at interpretation. "Dried specimens"; "bits cut with scissors," says Professor James; "an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories";[8] "a spectral woof of impalpable abstractions," says Mr. Bradley. True it is that we must be modest; the falsehood lies in denying that we have reached any reality at all.

(*b*) Professor James says: "Get full data. The only way in which to apprehend reality's thickness is either to experience it directly by being a part of reality oneself, or to evoke it in imagination by sympathetically divining some one else's inner life."[9] "If you are to make out the tunes rightly, you must open your ears to the whole volume of sound." True, and most valuable. The falsehood only comes when he tries to maintain that the data are the solution; that to see the stream is to see its make, and to hear the noise is to hear the tunes. In being myself I get my own experience in full, but how closely it is often folded, how undiscovered are its treasures, how little of its thickness do I apprehend! How seldom, in short, can I see the go of it and of me. Mr. Bradley's share in this truth is obvious. His share in the falsehood is, I think, more seeming than real, but those accuse him of it who object to his "it must be and can be, therefore it is." This, they say rightly, but I believe irrelevantly, is no sufficient answer to "*how* is it?"

[8] "Logic," p. 533.

[9] "A Pluralistic Universe," pp. 250, 251. *The Hibbert Journal*, p. 571.

(*c*) "Here, then, inside of the minimal pulses of experience, is realized that very inner complexity which the transcendentalist says only the absolute can genuinely possess!"[10] This is exactly what Mr. Bradley says about feeling,[11] and the truth and the danger are the same in both. Only Professor James seems to me to make the mistake which Mr. Bradley is only accused of making; a failure to distinguish sufficiently between the folded and the unfolded unity.

Professor James returns to feeling in petulance, Mr. Bradley in despondency. "These matters are too high for us," the latter writer seems to say now and then. "All our guesses are wrong; we can not see how things are; let us cling to our knowledge that they are. Truth beyond this seems unattainable." This has usually been put down to Mr. Bradley's agnosticism. Would it be unjust to take the other position as a result of too violent pragmatism? "We make truth. We make it very badly and with difficulty. Let us give up making it."

I have tried to write from the standpoint of those who conceive that reality does not wait for our thinking to make it, but that the discovery of reality does; that some discoveries can be made; and that it is the duty of philosophers to go on trying to make them. And in spite of everything this is presumably the real standpoint of all of us.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

BIRMINGHAM, ENGLAND.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and Human Welfare. Translated by LYDIA GILLINGHAM ROBINSON. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1909. Pp. xxiv + 178.

There is something perennial about Spinoza. The interest in his philosophy never completely dies. It may wane in one decade, but in the next it revives, and that is as might be expected. For Spinoza ranks with the great men of the world who have grappled with being in its entirety, "who saw life steadily and saw it whole." The lonely Jew of Amsterdam is the high-priest of pantheism, and only in a less degree than Jesus of Nazareth he is the prophet of catholicity. That which distinguishes pantheism from other systems of thought is its comparative freedom from any limits of race, clime or age. It has been, for the most part, the dim background of all religions; it is the inspiration and note of the noblest poetry, and if not the starting-point, it is at least the goal of all modern philosophies.

Thus Spinoza, though the child of the Orient, has found a home in the Occident, and has a fascination for and an affinity with all ages and all

[10] "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 284.

[11] "Appearance and Reality," pp. 520–522.

kinds of men. Lessing and Goethe, Novalis and Heine, are among the poets of Germany who have frankly acknowledged his influence; while of the philosophers, nearly all the moderns, with the exception of Kant—Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher—are indebted to his teaching. Nor is it only in Germany that his spell has been felt. If, in France, the School of Cousin was hostile, more lately men like Janet and Renan have been sympathetic, and to-day Spinoza is receiving his meed of attention from the most vigorous thinkers. In Britain and America, though for a time Spinozism was less cultivated than in Germany, France and Holland, there is not wanting evidence that it has not been altogether an unknown or negligible factor in literature and thought. Coleridge, who did so much to transplant the fruit of the great German revival of culture to English soil, was the first to create the modern appreciation of Spinoza in Britain. "I believe," he says in his "Biographia Literaria," "that the three great works since the introduction of Christianity are—Bacon's 'Novum Organum,' Spinoza's 'Ethics' and Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason.'" It was Coleridge who introduced the Dutch thinker to Wordsworth, in whose poetry none can fail to recognize a view of man and the world similar to that which the philosopher more systematically propounded. Among the early students of Spinoza must be mentioned Shelley, who actually began a translation of the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus." Nor must we omit Carlyle, M. Arnold and Froude, and in America, Longfellow and Emerson, as writers, who, to say the least of it, were aware of the importance of Spinoza. But if for a time the majesty of the critical philosophy and its development thrust Spinozism into the background, a revival of interest within the last decades can be detected. The bi-centenary of Spinoza's death, which fell in 1877, gave occasion for a concentration of activity, and from the land of its birth as well as from other countries there issued a number of monographs and expositions which gave fresh impetus to the study of his philosophy.

It is, however, remarkable that, while in Germany and France several excellent translations of Spinoza's works have appeared, there has been published no complete English edition, nor any trustworthy rendering of his most important books. The "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus" was translated in 1689, reprinted in 1737 and again translated in 1868. Dr. R. Willis, who was the acknowledged translator of the work just mentioned, published in 1870 a translation of the "Ethics." But in the estimate of scholars "this version is far too inaccurate to be of any serious use." There is still a later anonymous translation (New York, 1876), which unfortunately copies nearly all Dr. Willis's errors. The "De Intellectus Emendatione," the "Principia Philosophiæ and Cogitata Metaphysica," and the "De Deo et Homine" have never been, as far as we are aware, done into English.

It is therefore with the liveliest interest and sincerest gratitude that we welcome Miss Lydia Robinson's most lucid translation of Spinoza's "Short Treatise." In giving to English-speaking people the first version of this, the earliest of Spinoza's works, she has done something to remove a reproach which we have been too long content to merit. The treatise,

short though it is and written when its author was comparatively young, is too important for the student of philosophy to ignore. It is valuable in itself, but historically it is of much significance, as in it we see the system of Spinoza in the making. The exact date of its composition is unknown, but it is probable that Spinoza wrote it about the age of twenty-seven. When, in 1660, he was excommunicated from Amsterdam and took up his abode near Leyden, it is thought that he either left this treatise behind him to be circulated among his friends or sent it to them soon after his departure. It was originally written in Latin, but was immediately translated into Dutch by one of his friends. Both versions were lost sight of until the middle of the nineteenth century, when a copy of the Dutch manuscript was discovered, although no Latin original has ever been found.

The latest and best edition of the Dutch is that of I. Van Vloten and I. P. N. Land in Vol. III. of their "Benedicti De Spinoza Opera" (Hague, 1895). It is from this text Miss Robinson's translation has been made. As far as we are able to judge, the rendering seems accurate and faithful. We have noticed here and there a certain crudity and inelegance of expression, but that is probably due rather to the style of the author or transcriber than to the ineptitude of the present translator.

We hope that Miss Robinson will be encouraged by the success of this volume to continue her labors and give us ere long in an appropriate English dress the other treatises of Spinoza which still remain untranslated.

We are not sure that we approve of prefixing to the "Short Treatise," as the author has done, Schwegler's chapter on Spinoza taken intact from the English translation of his "History of Philosophy." We have no fault to find with Schwegler's brief account of Spinoza's philosophy, which, within its limits, is accurate and succinct. It is not, indeed, the best or fullest account that is known to us. Erdmann's, to name only one of the earlier expositions, is much more exhaustive and complete, and as Hutchison Stirling says, is distinguished beyond others in "that he has detected the Secret of Spinoza." But where so many analyses are easily available, it was scarcely worth while reprinting any particular account. We should fancy the student would prefer to have Spinoza's "Short Treatise" by itself, or, if an introduction was desirable, the space, in our opinion, might have been better utilized had Miss Robinson supplied us in her own words, with a brief history of the "De Deo et Homine," working out a comparison between it and his later writings, and showing particularly its agreement with and divergence from the "Ethics." This, so far as we know, has never been fully done. There are some paragraphs on the subject in Pollock's "Spinoza": and Dr. John Caird, in a note in his small volume, tells us that the limits of space precluded him from examining the "De Deo," etc., as a preliminary to the study of the "Ethics," as he had originally intended.

Such a comparison would be specially interesting as casting light upon the genesis and development of Spinoza's ideas. In one sense Spinoza was the most impersonal of all philosophers. The man and the

system stand apart, and seldom is there a hint in his writings as to what kind of personality he was, whence he drew his inspiration, or by what outward stages or internal conflict his conception of the universe attained to the completed form it assumes in the "Ethics." And yet in another sense there never was a thinker to whom Fichte's remark might be more appropriately applied, that a man's philosophy is determined by the kind of man he is. It would seem to be something more than a coincidence, as has been suggested by Hegel, that a Jew should develop the philosophy of idealism to its ultimate issue. Absolute unity and abstract monotheism are ideas peculiarly characteristic of the Oriental mind: and the nationality, associations, and education of this man not unnaturally predisposed him to start with the unity of God, and to give to his philosophy that theological, mystical complexion which the most competent scholars detect in it.

If we were to judge solely by the "Ethics" we might assume that Spinoza's dominating interest was the speculative one of simply overcoming the dualism of Descartes and elaborating a scientific conception of nature. The leading idea of his philosophy, as commonly accepted, is that of the unity and uniformity of the world. Nature, as conceived by him, includes thought not less than things, and the order of nature knows no interruption. But this conception of Spinoza is really two-sided. It has an ideal aspect and a physical or scientific. On the one hand, we find a line of reasoning derived from theology, which starts with the consideration of the nature and perfection of God. On the other hand, we have a view of the universe in harmony with the requirements of exact science. The union of these two elements, the pantheistic, or mystical element, and the scientific, is one of the most characteristic features of Spinoza's philosophy. Now the pantheistic element can be traced to the mediæval Jewish philosophers and to Giordano Bruno, with whose works Spinoza was familiar. The scientific element may be assigned to his study of Descartes' method and principle. But while the idea of natural law runs through the whole "Ethics" and gives unity to his entire conception of the universe, it is the practical part of his philosophy, his view of the nature of man and his relation to God, which is really the most original and most deeply colored with his own personality.

The question therefore arises which element—the theological and religious, or the scientific—was the dominating one in Spinoza's mind, and from which did his philosophy start? Now on the origin and growth of Spinoza's ideas this lately discovered essay on "God and Man" throws special light. It may be regarded, as Caird calls it, "as a kind of study for his greater or more systematic work," in which we see the writer feeling his way to the ideas concerning God and man which reappear, freed from their crude irrelevances, in their more mature and perfect form. It reveals the ferment and conflict of elements received from different quarters, but not yet subdued, as they afterwards were, to their proportionate places in the new structure. Above all, it affords evidence as to the practical aim of his thought, and positive proof that he really worked out his metaphysic by starting in the first instance from theology. The

leaders of mediæval Jewish thought had endeavored to express their theology in the Aristotelian mould of their age. Spinoza took up their work and sought, with the new instrument furnished by Descartes, to refashion it and carry their arguments to their ultimate issue.

The argument of the essay begins in a purely *a priori* manner with the nature and attributes of God. The absolute uniformity of nature and the implied rejection of final causes are deduced from a consideration of the divine freedom and perfection. There is no formal discussion of the two attributes, thought and extension, as there is in the "Ethics." Nor are the modes scientifically deduced as in the later work. By far the largest part of the essay is taken up with a treatment of man and his welfare. The love of God is represented as man's only true good. Only the knowledge of God will enable us to subdue the hurtful passions. This knowledge of God, which is the basis of all lesser knowledge, leads in turn to the *love* of God, which consists in the soul's union with Him. From this union also spring the true immortality and freedom of man.

The detachment from ordinary care, in which the essay makes man's happiness to consist, almost approaches to quietism. "Hate, the direct opposite of love, arises from error, originating in opinion . . . in all that there is or is thought to be, is nothing more than wretchedness itself in comparison with the true good. And is not such a lover of misery more worthy of pity than hate?" (Part II., Chap. 3.)

If we turn to the "Ethics" we find there also preeminence given to the knowledge and love of God, but the cares of life are not disparaged nor are the ordinary pleasures and pursuits, though not regarded as sufficient objects of life, treated as mere wretchedness. The love of God, though presented as in the "Short Treatise," as the perfect condition of the human mind, acquires a much more intellectual character and is scarcely to be distinguished from pure speculative knowledge.

Finally, in the "Short Treatise" we have an interesting light thrown upon an element in Spinoza's system which has caused a good deal of discussion—"the infinite modes"—elements which apparently Spinoza conceived, to bridge over the gulf between the infinite substance and the particular, finite modes. "There are," he says, "certain things immediately produced by God" which, though individual, are infinite in their kind and necessary in an eminent manner as being coextensive with the attributes to which they belong. What these infinite modes are is not stated in the "Ethics," but an explanation of them is to be found in the "Short Treatise" (Part I., Chap. 9). "We have knowledge of only two general *natura naturata* or modes of creations which depend immediately upon or are created by God: and there are *motion* in matter (*Stoffe*) and *understanding* in the thinking thing. We then say that these have been known from all eternity and will remain changeless to all eternity, truly a work as great as beseemeth the greatness of the master." It is worthy of note that motion and understanding—the eternal and immutable creatures, are called, by a striking Hebraism, "Sons of God"—language which has vanished from the more strictly scientific work, but which, appearing in the earlier treatise, indicates the influence of Jewish and neo-Platonic thought.

On the whole, while many other interesting points of contrast and similarity might be indicated, had we space, the essay is extremely valuable as showing not only the sources and development of Spinoza's philosophy, but also the dominating interest and particular trend of his thoughts. No philosopher has been so variously judged or misjudged as Spinoza. By some he has been execrated as the archenemy of religion. By others he has been extolled as the prophet of a higher cult. Dugald Stewart saw in his philosophy the seeds of blank atheism. Novalis called him the "God-intoxicated man." An atheist he by no means was. He denied indeed the personal God of the Christian, and he did not believe in the freedom of the will as it is commonly understood. He has been called a pantheist, though perhaps with Hegel it would be more correct to call him an acosmist. The world is in God, and we can only know it and ourselves through and by him. The "Short Treatise" shows indubitably that his main impulse towards philosophy is to find an answer to the question, Wherein does man's welfare and happiness consist and how can he best attain to it? Metaphysics, psychology, and physical science are interesting to him only as furthering the supreme problem, and the consideration of human utility is the dominating motive of all his speculation. The "Short Essay" discusses the same subjects as the "Ethics"—the aim of both is purely practical. It is a quest after life and blessedness. But whereas the carefully elaborated system with its rigorous adhesion to Descartes's mathematical method, in vogue at the time, has eliminated the personal element, the more informal character of the earlier work makes it possible to gain a glimpse of the young philosopher's effort to grasp at a tangible support upon which his highest intellectual and moral aspirations might rest after he had lost faith in the symbols of his childhood. To know God as the final cause of all things is for Spinoza the fundamental and, in a sense, the only principle which can explain the manifold variety of human endeavor. It is the condition and soul of social concord and security no less than of a virtuous character. Whatever is real is real only in and through God, for he is the immanent energy and life of all that is. This conception that nothing comes into being or continues in being, save in and through God, and that all that exists—the world with its varied energies, man with his restless passions and hopes—is real and instinct with divine power and perfection, is the dominating thought of all Spinoza's works. As early as the "Short Treatise" he has definitely and clearly grasped it, and all his later books not only embody it, but are simply the development of what is involved therein. It is no doubt true, as Sir Frederick Pollock has declared, that Spinoza would have been the last man to desire any one to become a Spinozist. But his inmost longing was that all men should be blessed with that inward peace which be proved by his own heroic experience to be identical with the self-control conferred and maintained by devout contemplation of God. There is much in his philosophy we may find fantastic and objectionable. We may object to the abstract and contentless nature of the substance. We may charge him with duality in his conception of the divine attributes of thought and extension: we may refuse

to accept as an explanation of life the ghostly phantoms into which he resolves all human existence: we may see in his whole system of philosophy indeed nothing but the "*Abgrund der Vernichtung*"—the abyss in which all particulars are annihilated, according to the Hegelian criticism —but nothing can detract from the profound and exalted idea of God's being which he conceived or the sublime aim which, by his life not less than his words, he set before man to find his highest good in devotion to the highest he knows.

ARCH. B. D. ALEXANDER.

LANGBANK, SCOTLAND.

Realities and Ideals. FREDERIC HARRISON. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1908. Pp. xiii + 462.

Forty-four essays are included in this volume, the first twenty-four being social and political, the last twenty concerned primarily with matters of literature and art, while all have a more or less direct ethical bearing. Certain essays written a number of years ago have acquired fresh interest through recent events. Such is the opening essay on "England and France," in which the author maintains that the progress of civilization in Europe will be most effectually furthered by the close cooperation and continued alliance of England and France. Many of the predictions made in this essay, first published in 1866, have been fulfilled in the *entente* at present existing between the countries in question. The renewed agitation for woman's suffrage gives added significance to the four chapters on the position and work of women. The author would secure for women a position in society equal in importance and dignity to that of men with as complete and thorough an education, but believes that social development demands not identity, but increasing differentiation, in the social function of the sexes. Hence he is strongly opposed to granting the ballot to women. In his essay on "Votes for Women" he advances the curious argument that women are unfit to participate in the affairs of government because they, like philosophers, preachers, and moralists, working in the *moral* sphere and exerting spiritual influence through their devotion to principles and ideals, are thereby unfitted to enter the *material* realm of government where not principles, nor theories, but expediency and compromise, must rule. Such arguments are plausible and entertaining. But with equal plausibility it may be argued that scholars and theorists are unfit for political activity for the opposite reason—viz., that the breadth of their knowledge, showing them both sides of every question, causes suspense of judgment and paralysis of the powers of action, while the ignorance of the ordinary citizen, allowing him to remain prejudiced and partisan, enables him to render more effective service to the political causes which he espouses. In harmony with this view that the moralist and preacher should confine themselves to methods of persuasion and influence, Mr. Harrison in his chapter on "The Veto on Drink" condemns all efforts to enact laws prohibiting the sale or use of intoxicants. The positivistic philosophy is seen at its best in such essays as those on "Centenaries," "Modern Pilgrimages," and

"The Use of Sunday," in which the author shows what ethical value may be given to certain traditional institutions and observances. In the essays of this volume the quality that most impresses one is the fine spirit of idealism which characterizes them all. While Mr. Harrison repudiates all supernaturalism, his "religion of humanity" is far from a naturalism which finds the good in the satisfaction of man's natural impulses and appetites. Rather it is the unfolding of the higher personal and spiritual capacities of man which he has always in mind as the *summum bonum*.

HENRY W. WRIGHT.

LAKE FOREST COLLEGE.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. July, 1909. *The Meaning of Φύσις in the Greek Physiologers* (pp. 369–383): A. O. LOVEJOY.–Discusses the rival interpretations of Φύσις as primitive and underlying substance, and as law and process of generation. Decides in favor of the former. *Kant's First Antinomy* (pp. 384–395): E. A. SINGER.–"No possible experiment could decide the issue between a finite distribution of bodies in space and an infinite, between a finite world history and an infinite." The situation implies the existence of an unknowable fact, a *Ding-an-sich*. The lesson of the antinomy is that we should "neglect no source of constant error, and should reduce the probable error of experiment more and more." *The Practical Character of Reality* (pp. 396–415): GRACE A. DE LAGUNA.–A very skillful and interesting demonstration of the incompatibility of two phases of pragmatism: viz., the instrumental theory of knowledge, and the immediastic theory of reality. The author appears to accept instrumentalism, and for that reason regards immediatism as a no less one-sided doctrine than absolutism. *Averroes on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* (pp. 416–428): ISAAC HUSIK.–An account of the work and method of Averroes, his relation to other commentators, and the accessibility to present-day occidental students of his writings. *Review of books* (pp. 429–445). Edward Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas:* E. B. MCGILVARY. Hans Driesch, *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism:* E. G. SPAULDING. M. Kronenberg, *Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus:* ELLEN BLISS TALBOT. *Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.*

Diès, Auguste. *La définition de l'être et la nature des idées dans le sophiste de Platon.* Paris: Félix Alcan. 1909. Pp. vii + 137.

Diès, Auguste. *Le cycle mystique: la divinité origine et fin des existences individuelles dans la philosophie antésocratique.* Paris: Félix Alcan. 1909. Pp. iv + 115.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series. Vol. IX. London: Williams and Norgate. 1909. Pp. 259. 10s. 6d. *net.*

NOTES AND NEWS

In the issue of this JOURNAL for July 22 notice was given of the second decennial celebration of the opening of Clark University at the university, Worcester, Massachusetts. It is announced in the program of these exercises that Clark University "will celebrate the completion of the twentieth year of its activity by a series of lectures and discussions in each of the departments of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, pedagogy, and history, and several academic and social meetings." We quote from the program some of the lectures and addresses of special interest. Professor E. H. Moore, of the University of Chicago, will deliver two lectures on the "Rôle of Postulation Methods in Mathematics"; and Professor J. W. A. Young, of the same university, will discuss the topic of the "Effectiveness of Mathematical Training." An interesting list of questions is published by the Physics Department as suggested subjects for discussion in the conferences to be held by that department on the teaching of physics in school, college, and university. In the special program of the chemical exercises it is announced that "A majority of the lectures will form critical summaries of the *status quo* of important chapters of chemical science, and will subsequently be published in a volume similar to those of Ahren's well-known *Sammlung*." The program for the psychological meetings contains the following lectures and conferences: "Diverse Ideals and Divergent Conclusions in the Study of Behavior in Lower Organisms," Dr. H. S. Jennings; "Psychological Problems in Anthropology," Dr. Frank Boas; "The Teaching of Psychology in Normal Schools," Chairman of the conference, Professor Guy Montrose Whipple; "The Opportunity and Need for Research in the Field of Education," Chairman of the conference, Dr. Elmer Ellsworth Brown; "The Past Ten Years in Experimental Psychology," Dr. E. B. Titchener; "Some Remarks on the Relations of Body and Mind," Dr. Leo Burgerstein; "The Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes," Dr. E. B. Titchener; "Elementary Psychology in the College," Chairman of the conference, Dr. Carl E. Seashore. The subject for consideration in the sessions of the History Department will be the countries of the far east—India, Japan, Korea, and China. The program for these meetings is exceedingly rich and varied.

At the celebration of the fifth centenary of the University of Leipzig five honorary degrees were conferred upon Americans. Professor E. B. Wilson, of Columbia University, received the degree of doctor of medicine; Professor Jacques Loeb, of the University of California, and Professor A. A. Michelson, of the University of Chicago, the degree of doctor of philosophy. Degrees were also conferred upon Mr. Rooosevelt and upon Professor J. W. Burgess, of Columbia University. The address made on behalf of American universities was delivered by President J. G. Schurman, of Cornell University.

Announcement was made in the last issue of this JOURNAL for August 19 of the Winnipeg meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science at the University of Manitoba on August 25. It is now

proposed to invite the British Association to meet in 1913 in Australia. The University of Melbourne is in communication with several Australian universities with a view to formulating definite proposals. It is suggested that the invitation should proceed from the commonwealth.

THE French Association for the Advancement of Science will meet this year at Lille during the week of September 2–7, under the presidency of Professor Landouzy, dean of the faculty of medicine in the University of Paris. The gold medal of the Association, which was instituted last year, is to be awarded to Professor H. Poincaré. Professor Poincaré will deliver a lecture in the course of the meeting.

THE Society of Anthropology has celebrated in the great amphitheater of the College of Medicine in Paris the fiftieth anniversary of its foundation. M. Bayet, the director of higher education at the Ministry of Public Instruction, presided, and a great number of delegates from France and foreign societies were present.

AT the Sixth International Congress of Psychology which was held at the University of Geneva during the week of August 3–7, honorary degrees were conferred upon a hundred and fifty persons. Among those to receive doctorates were Professor Ernst Haeckel, of the University at Jena, and Professor Ostwald.

DR. JOHN M. WARBEKE, of Williams College, contributes an article on Nietzsche to the July issue of the *Harvard Theological Review*. He describes Nietzsche as "anti-christ, superman, and pragmatist." The presence in one person of the qualities which such a description implies is undoubtedly the equivalent of genius.

DR. C. LLOYD MORGAN, F.R.S., has resigned the office of vice-chancellor of the University of Bristol. In accepting the same the council has placed on record its sense of the distinguished services rendered by him to the cause of university education during the twenty-two years of his tenure of office.

IT is interesting to note that, during the period of the celebration of the Darwin centenary in England and America, Lamarck, the French precursor of Darwin, was being honored in France. A statue of Lamarck was installed in Paris in the gardens of the Museum on June 13.

DR. KARL RUNGE, professor of philosophy in Göttingen, will be the Kaiser Wilhelm Professor at Columbia University for the coming academic year. Professor Runge will give an extended course of lectures on "Graphical Methods in Physics and Applied Mathematics."

M. MILHAUD, professor in philosophy in the University of Montpellier, has been appointed professor of the history of philosophy in its relations to the sciences, at the Sorbonne.

PROFESSOR W. WUNDT, of the University of Leipzig, has been appointed foreign member of the National Academy of Sciences at Washington, D. C.

THE Assembly of Iceland has decided to establish a university at Reikjavik, with four faculties and sixteen professors and lecturers.